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I. Introduction
On April 24, 2013, the Rana Plaza building in Savar,
Bangladesh, collapsed, killing 1,133 people.' Though the building
was not intended for industrial use, the owner had illegally
expanded it in order to rent space to garment factories.2 The day
before the collapse, cracks had appeared in the building's walls.'
An engineer was called to investigate and determined that the
f B.A. English Literature, 2008 Duke University; J.D. expected May 2015 University of
North Carolina School of Law.
I Press Release, Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, Accord
Statement Upon the Six-Month Anniversary of the Rana Plaza Disaster (Oct. 24, 2013),
available at http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/2013/10/six-month-rana-plaza-disaster-
anniversary/#more-500.
2 Building Materials Blamed in Bangladesh Disaster, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23,
2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/building-materials-blamed-bangladesh-disaster.
3 Id
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building was unsafe.' Although the building was closed to
shoppers, the workers were ordered into the factories.' The walls
fell in shortly after the workday started.'
In response to this and other disasters within the Bangladesh
garment industry, international retailers joined with unions and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to create the Accord on
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (the "Accord").' The
Accord is a legally binding agreement among the retailers supplied
by Bangladesh garment factories to create and fund a system for
factory inspection and repair.' The Accord is overseen by a
steering committee made up of equal members representing the
signing retailers and trade unions,' chaired by a neutral
representative chosen by the International Labour Organization
(ILO). o The signing retailers provide funding for . the
administration of the Accord." Signing companies are also
required to ensure available funding for factory repairs, either
through direct payments to supplying factories; loans;
renegotiating terms with suppliers; or soliciting donations from
NGOs or government bodies.12
Though it is not a perfect agreement," the Accord is an
important step forward in ensuring responsible labor practices in
4 Jim Yardley, Report on Bangladesh Building Collapse Finds Widespread Blame,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-
bangladesh-building-collapse-finds-widespread-blame.html.
5 See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2.
6 See Yardley, supra note 4.
7 See ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, May 13, 2013,
available at http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/theac
cord.pdf [hereinafter Accord].
8 See FAQs, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGLADESH,
http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/faqs/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
9 The terms of the Accord allow a maximum of three representatives from each
group. Decisions of the board are made by majority vote. Accord, supra note 7, at para.
4.
1o The ILO is a U.N. agency with 185 member states, dedicated to improving labor
practices by creating a debate between governments, employers, and worker
representatives. Tripartite Constituents, INT'L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global
/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2014).
11 FAQs, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 See infra Part VI.
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Bangladesh. The garment industry dominates Bangladesh's
economy. Clothing accounts for four-fifths of the country's
exports-a value of twenty-two billion dollars.14  Despite its
relatively small size, Bangladesh is the world's second-highest
garment exporter.15  Bangladesh has become popular in the
garment industry because it is so inexpensive. Retailers pay only a
tiny fraction of the retail price of their garments, and to support
this, suppliers pay low wages and cut corners in terms of safety."
However, Bangladesh has been slow to address these wage and
safety concerns, because many politicians are tied to the garment
industry." The Accord appropriately shares the responsibility of
improving labor conditions between the government and those
who have profited most from the system by legally binding
retailers to their third-party suppliers.
Part II of this Comment will describe the circumstances
necessitating the creation of the Accord. Part III will detail the
requirements the Accord imposes on its members. Part IV will
discuss the Bangladesh agreement that affects the Accord, the
National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural
Integrity in the Ready-Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh. Part
V will discuss the recent United States Supreme Court decision
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,'" which would likely limit
14 Shyamantha Asokan, Bangladesh Poised to Hike Garment Wages, But May Not
End Strikes, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-
bangladesh-garments-wage-idUSBRE99KO2M20131021.
'5 Only China exports more garments. Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building
Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-
collapse.html?pagewanted=all.
16 At the time of the Rana Plaza collapse, minimum wage for a worker was
approximately $37 a month. See Jim Yardley, Export Powerhouse Feels Pangs of Labor
Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/world/asia/as-
bangladesh-becomes-export-powerhouse-labor-strife-erupts.htm?pagewanted=all& r-0.
In November 2013, in response to protests, it was raised to $68 a month. However, a
January 2014 survey by the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association found 38% of the 594 factories polled were still not paying the new
minimum wage. See Bangladesh Garment Factories Failing to Pay Minimum Wage,
THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/662841/bangladesh-
garment-factories-failing-to-pay-minimum-wage/.
17 Yardley, Export Powerhouse Feels Pangs of Labor Strife, supra note 16 (noting
that in addition to factory owners being major political donors, ten percent of
parliament's members are themselves owners).
18 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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U.S. companies' liabilities as members of the Accord.19 Part VI
will analyze and discuss the benefits of the Accord (primarily
through contrasting it against the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker
Safety, a competing retailer safety plan20 ) weighed against the
liabilities it imposes and its shortcomings. Part VII will conclude
by urging the adoption of the Accord by retailers.
II. Problems within the Bangladesh Garment Industry
A. Tazreen Fashions Factory Fire
The Rana Plaza collapse was the deadliest event in the history
of the Bangladesh garment industry, but it was not the first to draw
attention to the country's working conditions. On November 24,
2012, a fire tore through the Tazreen Fashions factory, which filled
a city block in an industrial suburb of Dhaka, Bangladesh.2 1 One
hundred and twelve of the 1,400 workers in the factory died.2 2 Just
a few months before the fire, the local fire department had refused
to renew a certification required for the factory to operate, but no
official made any effort to halt its operation.23 Like the owner of
Rana Plaza, the owner of Tazreen Fashions had received a permit
19 Though a few major U.S. retailers have signed onto the Accord, the majority of
its signatories are European companies. Most notably, Gap and Wal-Mart have declined
to join the Accord, arguing that its binding nature could result in liability in U.S. courts
for another factory disaster. Proponents of the Accord argue the hesitant retailers are
more concerned with avoiding the cost of factory repairs. Steven Greenhouse, U.S.
Retailers See Big Risk in Safety Plan for Factories in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/business/legal-experts-debate-us-retailers-
risks-of-signing-bangladesh-accord.html?pagewanted=all.
20 The Alliance was also formed in response to the Rana Plaza disaster by North
American retailers who did not want to sign onto the Accord. It similarly calls for
retailers to fund factory inspections, but has been criticized for not being legally binding
and not requiring retailers to directly fund improvements. See Steven Greenhouse &
Stephanie Clifford, U.S. Retailers Offer Plan for Safety at Factories, N.Y TIMES, Jul. 10,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/1 1/business/global/us-retailers-offer-safety-plan-
for-bangladeshi-factories.html?pagewanted=all.
21 Julhas Alam, Dhaka Factory Lost Fire Certification, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 7,
2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-bangladesh-factory-lost-fire-safety-
clearance-months-112-killed-blaze.
22 Id.
23 Options for government officials included levying fines, closing the factory, or
ordering the destruction of illegally constructed floors. However, inspectors opted to
allow the factory to continue operating without restriction while it ostensibly made safety
upgrades. Id.
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to build a smaller structure (here, three stories) and then illegally
added an additional five floors; a ninth floor was in construction
when the fire struck.24 Despite its 1,400 workers, the building had
no external fire escapes, no sprinkler system, and only three
interior staircases.25 The owner was also using the open-air ground
floor as a warehouse for fabric and yarn-although the law
required it be stored in a room with fireproof walls-which
allowed the flames to spread quickly.26 Even after fire alarms
went off, some managers told workers to ignore them and continue
working.2 7 Managers went as far as to close gates to stop workers
from leaving, and the factory lacked a mandatory television
monitoring system.28
The initial police investigation into the fire suggested saboteurs
started it and found there was not enough evidence to charge the
factory owner, Delowar Hossain. 29  However, under mounting
social pressure, the Bangladesh High Court ordered a special
government investigation.30 After discovering the numerous safety
abuses in the factory, the investigation said Hossain had
committed "unpardonable negligence."' Despite these findings,
charges were not filed at that time.32 Finally, in December 2013,
Hossain, his wife Mahmuda Akther (who was a co-owner), the
24 Id.
25 Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Bangladesh Finds Gross Negligence in
Factory Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/
world/asia/bangladesh-factory-fire-caused-by-gross-negligence.html.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 Julfikar Ali Manik & Ellen Barry, Months After Deadly Fire, Owners of
Bangladesh Factory Surrender to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/02/1 0/world/asialowners-of-bangladesh-factory-surrender-in-deadly-
fire.html?_r-0.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Id.
32 Despite the findings, many were skeptical that charges would ever be filed.
While factory managers were occasionally charged, lawyers and activists have routinely
faced obstacles in prosecuting owners for factory disasters. Proceedings are often
delayed and reports go missing, which activists see as a stall tactic intended to frustrate
them into giving up litigation and remove disasters from the public eye. See Jim
Yardley, Justice Still Elusive in Factory Disasters in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/asia/justice-elusive-in-a-bangladesh-
factory-disaster.html?pagewanted=all.
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factory manager, an engineer, and nine others were charged with
culpable homicide." Hossain and Akther did not surrender
themselves until February 9, 2014.34 Hossain intends to plead not
guilty, maintaining that since he was not at the factory at the time
of the fire, he was not involved.
The Tazreen factory, like most Bangladesh garment producers,
made clothes for multiple retailers, including Wal-Mart." In 2011,
Wal-Mart internally audited the factory and labeled it "high-
risk."" A few months later, when a second audit showed no
improvement in conditions, Wal-Mart stopped using the factory
for production." However, at the time of the fire, Wal-Mart
brands were still being made in the factory because another Wal-
Mart supplier had subcontracted with Tazreen without the
company's knowledge.
In response to this fire, the ILO brought together the
Bangladesh Ministry of Labor and Employment, domestic unions,
and factory owners to create the National Tripartite Plan of Action
on Fire Safety for the Ready-Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh
(Plan of Action).4 0 The Plan of Action sought to identify unsafe
factory conditions and propose legislative and practical solutions
in order to rectify the conditions.4 1 However, the Plan of Action
33 Manik & Berry, supra note 28.
34 Id.
35 See id.
36 Alam, supra note 21.
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 Id. Subcontracting has presented a significant barrier to self-regulation of
Bangladesh factories. Companies committed to responsible production will often inspect
the factories of their principle suppliers, but when these suppliers cannot meet demand,
they send production to third parties that fall outside these inspections. See Andreas
Wieland & Robert Handfield, The Socially Responsible Supply Chain, 17 SUPPLY CHAIN
MGMT. REv. 22, 25 (2013).
40 Press Release, International Labour Organization, Fire Safety - Tripartite
Partners Adopt National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety for the Ready-Made
Garment Sector in Bangladesh (Mar. 25, 2013), available at http://www.ilo.org
/dhaka/Informationresources/Publicinfonation/Pressreleases/WCMS_208172/lang--
en/index.htm.
41 National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety for the Ready-Made Garment
Sector in Bangladesh, Mar. 16 2013. available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/grouips
/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilodhaka/documents/genericdocunent/wcns_20'9285.pdf
[hereinafter Plan of Action].
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did not solicit support from the retailers being supplied by the
factories.42
B. The Rana Plaza Collapse
The Rana Plaza building was never meant to be a factory. 43 It
was built with "'extremely poor quality iron rods and cement"'
on unstable land that "'had been a body of water before and was
filled with rubbish."' 45 The owner was given permission to build a
six-story, non-industrial building but illegally added two floors to
rent to garment factories.46 In addition to the weight of the
equipment and generators used by the factories, the vibrations of
the machinery would shake the entire building.47 However, due to
the owner's political connections (and alleged gang affiliations and
bribery), the building was never threatened with closure.4 8
On April 23, the day before the disaster, the shaking was so
severe that cracks formed in the building's walls, causing workers
to flee. 49  An engineer was called to examine the building, and
though he concluded that the building was extremely unsafe and
should be closed immediately, the building's owner claimed that it
was only broken plaster.so The next morning, the factories were
opened as usual.s' Some workers reported that when they were
hesitant to enter, managers threatened to dock them an entire
month's pay.52 When the building collapsed, approximately 3,500
42 See infra Part IV (discussing additional details of the Plan of Action).
43 See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2.
44 Id. (quoting Khandker Mainuddin Ahmed, head of the government committee
tasked with investigating the disaster).
45 Id. (quoting Khandker Mainuddin Ahmed, head of the government committee
tasked with investigating the disaster).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Jim Yardley, The Most Hated Bangladeshi, Toppled From a Shady Empire, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/asia/bangladesh-
garment-industry-reliant-on-flimsy-oversight.htm?pagewanted=all.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Jason Burke, Bangladesh Factory Collapse Leaves Trail of Shattered Lives, THE
GUARDIAN (Jun. 6, 2013, 8:37 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/jun/06/bangladesh-factory-building-collapse-community.
52 Id.
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people were inside." One survivor was trapped in the rubble for
seventeen days, and the official recovery was stopped after twenty
days. 54
The day after the collapse, Sohel Rana, the owner and builder
of the plaza, was arrested after he was found hiding near the Indian
border, hoping to flee the country.s In July, a government
investigative committee issued a report finding widespread blame
for the construction of Rana Plaza, and the mayor of Savar, whose
office approved the building permit, was also arrested.56 The
committee called for all involved to be charged with culpable
homicide-a charge that could result in a life sentence." Charges
were filed against Rana and seventeen others on July 16, 2014." It
is unlikely that Rana will escape such high profile charges, but
some Bangladeshis are understandably worried that justice will not
be served, due to Rana's political connections and past instances
of Bangladeshi corruption.
C. A Continuing History of Unsafe Factories
The Rana Plaza collapse and Tazreen fire focused the world's
attention on Bangladesh factory safety, and while those events
have mobilized national and international organizations to improve
safety in the garment industry, Bangladesh continues to be plagued
by accidents. Less than a month after Rana Plaza, a fire destroyed
the Tung Hai Sweater Factory in the Mirpur district of Dhaka,
killing eight people.o The fire occurred at eleven o'clock after the
53 Hisham Bin Mustafa, Brief History of the Rana Plaza Tragedy, PRIYo NEWS
(May 14, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://news.priyo.com/2013/05/14/end-savar-battle.html.
54 Id.
55 Yardley, The Most Hated Bangladeshi, supra note 48.
56 Rana was also required to get a permit from the Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakkha
(Rajuk), a national regulatory agency tasked with overseeing urban development. The
mayor began issuing local permits because he felt Rajuk acted too slowly. Syed Zain Al-
Mahmood, Bangladesh Police Arrest Mayor of Town in Rana Plaza Garment Building
Collapse, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SBl0001424127887324564704578626171088096096.
57 Id.
58 Bangladesh Charges 18 Over Garment Factory Collapse, REUTERS (July 16,
2014, 5:37 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/bangladesh-ranaplaza-
idlNL4NOPR33Q20140716.
59 See Yardley, The Most Hated Bangladeshi, supra note 48.
60 Jim Yardley, Fire at Bangladesh Factory Kills 8, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/1 0/world/asia/fire-at-bangladeshi-factory-kills-8.html.
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workers left, limiting the death toll, but struck while upper level
management was holding a meeting with local police officials.6'
The police deputy inspector general and the factory's managing
director (who was also a director of the Bangladesh Garment
Manufacturers and Exporters Association, an important trade
group) were killed.62 At that time, the factory was undergoing
repairs to its electrical systems but had not been closed." An
investigation into the fire indicated that it started when sparks from
a short-circuit fell onto piles of yarn stored in the open, and the
smoke and fumes poisoned and suffocated those inside.64 The
factory's 1,800 workers had left less than an hour before the fire
started.
On October 8, 2013, another fire hit in the Aswad Composite
Mills factory, killing ten and injuring dozens. Like the Tung Hai
factory, Aswad was closed when the fire started, but unfortunately
200 workers were still in the building, working overtime." While
the loss of life was thankfully comparatively small compared to
Rana Plaza or Tazreen, the Aswad fire frustrated activists, because
it demonstrated how little had changed since those disasters. 68 An
investigation into the fire did not establish a cause, but determined
that the fire started on the first floor, trapping workers inside.
The factory was producing clothes for several Western retailers,
including Loblaw, the parent company to several Canadian
clothing brands. 0 Loblaw, however, stated it had stopped ordering
from this factory in April 2013, leading it to believe one of its
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Mohosinul Karim, 'Toxic Fumes' Were Behind Tung Hai Factory Deaths,
DHAKA TRIB. (May 29, 2013), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/
2013/may/29/'toxic-fumes'-were-behind-tung-hai-factory-deaths.
65 Id.
66 Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Deadly Fire Hits Bangladesh Factory, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023041718045
79123704212316452.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. Bangladesh factories, including Tazreen and Tung Hai, frequently store yarn
and fabric on lower floors in extremely unsafe manners. See supra Part II(A)-(B).
70 Al-Mahmood, supra note 66.
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other suppliers had subcontracted with Aswad." Aswad had been
on the Accord's list of factories marked for future inspection,
underscoring the importance of beginning inspections as soon as
possible.72 The Aswad factory was owned by the Palmal Group, a
large Bangladeshi conglomerate that runs twenty-seven other
factories.73
III. Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh
Retailers responded quickly to the Rana Plaza disaster. On
May 13, 2013, just three weeks after the collapse, the largest
purchasers of Bangladeshi garments announced the creation and
signing of the Accord.74 The Accord was the result of
collaboration between the retailers supplied by Bangladeshi
factories and workers' unions, with input from NGOs concerned
with improving international labor standards." Currently, the
Accord has over 170 retailer signatories and ten union members
(the massive international unions IndustriALL Global Union,76
UNI Global Unionn, and eight Bangladeshi garment unions).
7' Id.
72 Id. Parties to the Accord, having recently finalized its inspection standards, have
started inspecting a small pilot group of factories. See also Press Release, Accord on
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Accord Reaches 150 Signatory
Mark (Feb. 12, 2014), available at http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/2014/02/
bangladesh-accord-i 50-signatories/ (noting that factory inspections had begun).
73 Al-Mahmood, supra note 66.
74 Steven Greenhouse & Jim Yardley, Major Retailers Join Bangladesh Safety
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/world/
asia/bangladeshs-cabinet-approves-changes-to-labor-laws.html?pagewanted=all.
75 Id.
76 IndustriALL represents 50 million workers in 140 countries across a variety of
industries. About Us, INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION, http://www.industriall-
union.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
77 UNI represents "20 million workers from over 900 trade unions" across a variety
of industries. About Us, UNI GLOBAL UNION, http://www.uniglobalunion.org/about-us
(last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
78 Signatories, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGLADESH,
http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). The largest
of the signing retailors are European companies, most notably the British companies
Primark and Tesco and "the Swedish retail giant H&M"-the single largest purchaser of
Bangladeshi garments. Greenhouse & Yardley, supra note 74. The most prominent
American retailer at the time of signing was "PVH, the parent company of Calvin Klein,
Tommy Hilfiger, and Izod." Id. Since its announcement, a few more American retailers,
such as Fruit of the Loom, Abercrombie & Fitch, and American Eagle Outfitters, have
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These retailers source from approximately 1,600 different factories
across Bangladesh. 9 The Accord's goal is "a safe and sustainable
Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garment ("RMG") industry in which no
worker needs to fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents."so
The Accord's terms are legally binding on the signatories for five
years.
To oversee its mission, the Accord sets up a steering
committee (the "SC") composed of equal members chosen by the
retailers and the unions.82 The ILO also chooses a member to act
as a "neutral chair" of the SC." This committee is tasked with
developing and implementing the standards of the Accord in
collaboration with the Bangladesh Ministry of Labor and
Employment and a comparable committee set up by the Plan of
Action.8 4 in order to create a unified approach with respect to
inspections and safety standards, the terms of the Accord require
frequent consultation with the Plan of Action Committee and, if
possible, a "shared advisory structure."" The SC is also
responsible for selecting and reviewing the main officers of the
Accord: the Safety Inspector and the Training Coordinator." The
SC's final obligation is dispute resolution. Should a dispute arise
between members of the Accord, it will be presented to and
decided by the SC." Any party that is not satisfied with the SC's
decision can appeal, which will result in a "final and binding
arbitration process."
The provision for binding arbitration is what gives the Accord
its legal heft and separates it from previous agreements on
internally improving industry safety. Under the Accord,
also joined the Accord. Id.
79 Accord Public Disclosure Report I Sept. 2014, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING
SAFETY BANGLADESH (Sept. 1, 2014), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/
uploads/Accord-Public-Disclosure-Report- I -September-2014.pdf.
80 Accord, supra note 7, at Preamble.
81 FA Qs, supra note 8.
82 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 4.
83 Id.
84 Id. at para. 7.
85 Id. at para. 6.
86 Id. at para. 4.
87 Id. at para. 5.
88 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 5.
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arbitration awards are subject to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards8 9 (the
New York Convention). The New York Convention obligates
signing nationso to recognize a written agreement "under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration."9 1 If there are any
arbitral awards ordered, arising under such an agreement, a
participating country "shall recognize [them] as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon."9 2 Therefore, the local
courts of each member of the Accord have the authority and
jurisdiction to enforce an award made against a company that may
break its obligations.
The Accord divides participating retailers' suppliers into three
categories.9 3 Tier 1 factories are those that make 30% or more of a
company's total, annual production in Bangladesh.9 4 These
factories are required to have safety inspections, fire safety
training, and supply remediation to displaced workers." Factories
that do not qualify as Tier 1, but are still "major or long-term
suppliers" are classified as Tier 2 factories.9 6 At least 65% of a
member's production must come from Tier I and Tier 2
factories." Tier 2 factories receive inspections and are obligated
to provide remediation, but they do not have to receive training.98
Factories producing less than 10% of a company's garments are
Tier 3.99 No more than 35% of a member's total production can
89 Id.
90 Bangladesh, the United States, and all the countries of Europe are among the 149
countries that have signed the New York Convention. List of Contracting States, N.Y.
ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-
contracting-states (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
91 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11 [hereinafter The
New York Convention].
92 Id. at art. III.
93 Accord, supra note 7, at paras. 1-3.
94 Id. at para. 1.
95 Id.
96 Id. at para. 2.
97 Id.
98 Id. at para. 2.
99 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 3.
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come from Tier 3 factories.'" These factories are only subject to
"limited initial inspections," but if a facility is determined to be
high risk, it will be treated as if it were a Tier 2 factory, regardless
of its production percentage."o' Any supplier, even if
subcontracted by another without the knowledge of the retailer, is
intended to be covered by Accord's inspection standards.10 2
The Chief Safety Inspector0 3 is tasked with overseeing and
coordinating the factory inspections. 0 4 He will determine the
safety standards required in collaboration with the Plan of Action
committee and select personnel to perform inspections.'" The
Accord allows companies to continue inspecting their own
factories if they so choose, but their processes and standards must
be approved by the Chief Safety Inspector, and they must provide
100 Id.
1o Id.
102 Press Release, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH,
Statement on Unauthorized Subcontracting to Accord Signatories in Dutch Media (Jan.
25, 2014), http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/2014/01/statement-unauthorised-
subcontracting-accord-signatories-dutch-medial ("'Unauthorised sub-contracting is one
of the many recognised challenges for the Accord and it is impossible for the Accord
alone to end the practice of unauthorised subcontracting. Where factories of
unauthorised subcontractors are identified and confirmed as supplying an Accord
signatory, they will be subject to the same process of inspection as primary suppliers.
Our inspectors will inspect and support remediation of safety issues at such locations
where necessary."').
103 On October 17, 2013, the Accord announced the SC had chosen Brad Loewen as
the Chief Safety Inspector. Loewen was previously Administrator of Commercial Plan
Examination and Inspections for the city of Winnipeg, Canada, and has experience in
"fire safety, workplace safety and health, mediation and conciliation, and engineering."
Press Release, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, Bangladesh
Accord Appoints Its Leadership Team (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.bangladesh
accord.org/2013/1 0/bangladesh-accord-appoints-leadership-team/#more-368.
104 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 8.
105 Id. at para. 9. On January 14, 2014, the Accord published their finalized building
standards. The standards are the result of collaboration between the Accord's Safety
Inspector, the National Tripartite Plan of Action, the Alliance, and the ILO. Press
Release, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, Accord Announcement
of Factory Safety Inspection Standards (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bangladesh
accord.org/2014/0 1/factory-safety-inspection-standards/. The seventy-four page
document is intended to be as comprehensive as possible and addresses appropriate
building materials, construction practices, necessary safety features for factories,
procedures for adding onto buildings, and "human element programs," such as fire drills
and evacuation routes. See The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh,
Building Standard, Dec. 30, 2013, available at http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/wp-
content/uploads/Accord-building-standard.pdf.
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access to all findings.106 The goal of the Accord is to inspect all
member factories within two years.'0o If the Chief Safety
Inspector determines that a factory poses an immediate danger, he
notifies the factory's management, local union officials (if any),
the Chief Safety Inspector, and the union members of the
Accord.' When a factory is deemed dangerous, the companies it
supplies require the factory to make repairs."
. Tier 1 factories are required to train workers in addition to
receiving inspections."o The Training Coordinator appointed by
the Safety Inspector, will provide any qualifying factory with
programs on basic safety measures and precautions to ensure
management and workers know what to do during a fire or other
disaster."' The programs are meant not only to encourage safe
practices but also to ensure that workers have an opportunity to
raise any specific concerns that they may have." 2 To that end, the
Accord also requires all factories (regardless of tier) to create a
Health and Safety Committee to discuss factory concerns."' At
least half of the members of these committees must be workers.114
These committees also work with safety inspectors to ensure that
workers know if a factory is a severe danger."s
The Accord takes several other steps to increase workers'
rights. In addition to the Health and Safety Committees that give
workers a voice, it requires members to end relationships with
suppliers that do not provide compensatory wages for up to six
months when a factory closes for repairs."16 Companies are also
required to make reasonable efforts to find workers new
employment if they are fired as a result of cutbacks in orders to a
1o6 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 10.
107 Id. at para. 9.
08 Id. at para. i1.
109 Id. at para. 12.
110 Id. at para. 16.
1M1 Id. The government committee investigating the Tazreen Fashions fire found
several preparedness issues that increased the death toll, such as an improper escape plan
and lack of training on how to use fire extinguishers. See Manik & Yardley, supra note
25.
112 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 16.
113 Id. at para. 17.
114 Id.
115 Id. at para. 11.
116 Id. at para. 13.
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particular factory." 7 Workers who refuse to work based on a
reasonable fear for safety cannot be discriminated against, forced
to work, docked pay, or fired."'
The administrative costs of the Accord are provided by the
signatory companies."' Each company provides funding based on
its percentage of garment production in Bangladesh with a
maximum contribution of $500,000.120 This money goes towards
the cost of facilities and operations for the SC, factory inspections,
and training programs.12 The money for factory upgrades comes
primarily through economic incentives. First, companies are
required to terminate business with any factory that does not agree
to participate in the measures required by the Accord.'2 2 For
factories that accept the repairs, the cost is to come primarily from
renegotiating contracts to give more favorable terms to
suppliers.'23 Such terms should "ensure that it is financially
feasible" for factories to create safe work environments. 124
Furthermore, companies cannot abandon factories for negligible
price increases, as the Accord requires them to continue
purchasing at the same or greater volume for the first two years of
participation, provided it is "commercially viable." 25  To
supplement these arrangements, companies are also encouraged to
directly invest in factories, give loans, pay for repairs, or solicit
donations from NGOs and other governments.126 Regardless of the
method, member retailers are required to ensure that funds are
available for a supplier trying to make repairs.127  The SC is
responsible for ensuring that all funds are accounted for and used
responsibly.128
117 Id. at para. 14.
118 Accord, supra note 7, at para. 15.
119 Id. at para. 24.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at para. 21.
123 Id. at para. 22.
124 See Accord, supra note 7, at para. 22.
125 Id. at para. 23.
126 Id. at para. 22.
127 See id.
128 See id. at para. 25.
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IV. National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety [and
Structural Integrity] in the Ready-Made Garment Sector
in Bangladesh
As discussed in Part III, the Accord is closely tied to the Plan
of Action that preceded it. The original Plan of Action was
formally adopted on March 24, 2013, in response to the fire at
Tazreen Fashions.129 It was facilitated by the ILO130 and signed by
the Bangladesh Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoLE) and
the garment industry's leading trade associations, including the
very influential Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association (BGMEA).' ' Unlike the Accord, the Plan of Action
is an agreement only between Bangladeshi entities and does not
include retailers.13 2 In its broadest terms, the goal is to improve
worker safety through three paths: legislative, administrative, and
practical.' 33 In order to facilitate the implementation of the plan,
Bangladesh formed the High-Level Tripartite Committee (High
Committee),'3 4 which is made up of a representative from each
signatory and relevant cabinet members,' 3  chaired by the
Secretary of the MoLE. 3 6  On July 25, the High Committee
amended the Plan of Action slightly in response to the Rana Plaza
collapse, renaming it the National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire
Safety and Structural Integrity in the Ready-Made Garment Sector
in Bangladesh' (Integrated Plan of Action) but substantively
129 See Press Release, International Labour Organization, supra note 40.
130 See Plan of Action, supra note 41, at 2.
131 See id. at 12.
132 See id. at 2.
133 See id. at 2-3.
134 See id. at 3.
135 Members are as follows: Director of the Department Labour, Deputy Secretary
of the MoLE, Chief Inspector of the Department of Inspection for Factories and
Establishments, head of RAJUK, Director General of the Bangladesh Fire Service and
Civil Defense, President of the Bangladesh Employers Federation, President of the
BGMEA, President of the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters'
Association, head of the National Coordination Committee for Worker's Education, and
head of the Bangladesh National Council. Id. at 15.
136 See Plan of Action, supra note 41, at 3.
137 National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity in the
Ready-Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh, Jul. 25, 2013, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Informationresources/VCMS_221543/lang--en/index.htm
[hereinafter Integrated Plan of Action].
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keeping the same plan as the March agreement.1
The MoLE is assigned the majority of duties under the
Integrated Plan of Action.139  Under the legislative prong of the
plan, it is tasked with submitting a labor law reform package to
Parliament, drafting a National Occupational Safety and Health
Policy (with input from the ILO), reviewing and updating current
safety and building laws, and creating a specialized task force on
building and fire safety as part of the Cabinet Committee for the
Ready-Made Garment Sector.140 The MoLE is also responsible for
implementing an overhaul of the administrative agencies that
monitor Bangladesh's garment industry.141 Its first step is filling
vacancies and adding an additional 200 inspectors, with the
ultimate goal of having at least 800 inspectors in the Department
of Inspection for Factories and Establishments.14 2 Bangladesh has
allocated three million dollars to help meet these goals. 143  The
MoLE also wants to update the way it trains inspectors and secures
funding for new equipment and infrastructure for inspectors and
local firefighters.'" Finally, the MoLE hopes to unify government
agencies currently responsible for permits and licensing to
eliminate overlap and close gaps (like the local license issued for
Rana Plaza in lieu of national building permit).145
The BGMEA and the other groups representing manufacturers
are required to begin practical self-policing to supplement the
138 Press Release, International Labour Organization, Government, Employers and
Workers Organizations Sign Integrated National Action Plan on Fire Safety and
Structural Integrity in the Garment Sector (Jul. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Informationresources/Publicinfornation/Pressreleases/WCMS
218230/lang--en/index.htm. Under the Integrated Plan of Action, the secretary general
of IndustriALL Bangladesh Council replaced the head of the Bangladesh National
Council on the High Committee. See Integrated Plan of Action, supra note 137, at 16.
139 See Integrated Plan of Action, supra note 137, at 5-8.
140 See id. at 5-6.
141 See id. at 6-8.
142 Id. at 6-7. The Department is already well on their way to meeting their goal.
On January 15, 2014, they sanctioned 679 new positions, including 392 new inspectors,
which would increase the total from 183 to 575 inspectors. Press Release, International
Labour Organization, ILO Welcomes the Upgrading of the Bangladesh Labour
Inspectorate (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Informationresources/
Publicinformation/Pressreleases/WCMS_235289/lang--en/index.htm.
143 Integrated Plan of Action, supra note 137, at 7.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 7-8.
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MoLE's obligations. The BGMEA is tasked with developing a
scale on which a factory's need for improvement can be judged,
creating a system to increase transparency and accountability for
suppliers that sub-contract to other factories, requiring all mid-
level managers of its members to attend a fire-safety course, and
rehabilitating and reemploying the disabled and out-of-work
victims of Rana Plaza. 146 The Integrated Plan of Action gives the
High Committee the lead in developing a national system for
improving safety based on the BGMEA's findings on need
assessment but also specifically acknowledges and welcomes input
from the Accord.147  The plan aims to complete government
inspections of all garment factories by December 2014.148
The ILO has worked closely with Bangladesh to implement
and encourage the Integrated Plan of Action. The High
Committee has tasked the Bangladesh University of Engineering
and Technology with inspecting any factory not covered by the
Accord or the Alliance. 149 Inspections started on November 22,
2013."s0 Inspectors will follow a criteria developed in
collaboration with the ILO, the Accord, and the Alliance to ensure
a uniform standard is applied to all factory inspections."' To help
achieve these goals, the Government of Bangladesh and the ILO
has pledged $24.21 million over three and a half years for the
"Improving Working Conditions in the Ready-Made Garment
Sector" initiative.'52 According to Gilbert Fossoun Houngbo (ILO
Deputy-Director General for Field Operations and Partnerships),
"This programme will provide support in implementing the
National Tripartite Plan of Action on fire safety and structural
integrity. Successful implementation of the programme will
146 Id. at 8-14.
147 See id. at 9.
148 Id.
149 Press Release, International Labour Organization, RMG Building Safety
Inspections to Start Tomorrow After Major Breakthrough (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Infornationresources/Publicinformation/Pressreleases/WCMS
_230293/lang--en/index.htm.
150 Id.
is, See id.
152 Press Release, International Labour Organization, Major ILO Programme Aims
to Make Bangladesh Garment Industry Safer (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Informationresources/Publicinformation/Pressreleases/WCMS
226720/lang--en/index.htm.
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ensure better working conditions and safety for the ready-made
garment workers in Bangladesh.""s3 The United Kingdom and the
Netherlands have already contributed $15 million to the program,
and the ILO is currently seeking additional funds.'
V. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and U.S. Corporate
Liability.
Multiple U.S. companies have cited liability concerns as their
reason for not joining the Accord,' 5 but recent developments in
domestic law, primarily the holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., should mitigate these objections.' The issue
presented in Kiobel was "whether and under what circumstances
courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States.""
Petitioners were Nigerian nationals who had moved to the U.S.
after being granted political asylum.' They were formerly
residents of Ogoniland, the name given to a 250 square mile area
in the Niger Delta.'15  During the early 1990s, residents of
Ogoniland were viciously persecuted by the Nigerian military,
which would attack Ogoni villages by "beating, raping, killing,
and arresting residents and destroying or looting property.""
Petitioners alleged that the persecution was at the behest of Shell
Petroleum Development Company ("SPDC")"' because the
inhabitants of Ogoniland had been protesting the effects of the
company's oil exploration and production practices. 6 2 Petitioners
also claimed that the respondents gave aid to the military forces
and allowed them to stage attacks on their land."' They filed suit
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Greenhouse, supra note 19.
156 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-70.
157 Id. at 1662.
158 Id. at 1663.
159 Id. at 1662.
o60 Id.
161 SPDC was a subsidiary of the holding companies Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company, against whom the Ogoni filed suit.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
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under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),'" on the theory that the oil
companies had broken the law of nations by aiding and abetting
human rights violations. 165
The Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal 6 6 of the
Nigerian nationals' complaint, but for different reasons.167  The
Court's holding centered "on a canon of statutory interpretation
known as the presumption against extraterritorial application,"
which stands for the idea that "[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."'6  This
presumption is made to prevent conflicts between the laws of the
United States and laws of other nations and to prevent courts from
accidentally interfering in foreign policy when interpreting
legislation.'6 1 In cases involving the ATS (and even more so when
such an action "reaches conduct within the territory of another
sovereign"), the possibility of negatively impacting foreign policy
is high, so courts should be wary about expanding the statute.170
Given these concerns, the Court held that "the presumption against
extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power
under the ATS.""' Looking at the text and history'72 of the statute,
the Court found "no support for the proposition that Congress
expected causes of action to be brought under the statute for
164 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
165 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
166 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the claim on the theory that since
corporations had never "been subject to any form of liability under the customary
international law of human rights, . . . the ATS . . . simply does not confer jurisdiction
over suits against corporations." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,
121 (2d. Cir. 2010).
167 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
168 Id. (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
169 See id.
170 See id. at 1664-65.
171 Id. at 1665.
172 The Court noted that historically only three crimes violated the law of nations:
"violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy," all
which could, by definition, only occur within the country or at sea, outside any
jurisdiction. See id. at 1666-67. The statute was created to "provide judicial relief to
foreign officials injured in the United States," not to create "a uniquely hospitable forum
for the enforcement of international norms." Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
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violations of the law of nations occurring abroad,""' so therefore
the "presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under
the ATS."l7 4
The Court offers one narrow way to rebut the presumption
against extraterritorial application: courts may be allowed to hear
cases on actions occurring outside the United States, under the
ATS, when the claims "touch and concern the territory of the
United States" with "sufficient force."'7 5  "[M]ere corporate
presence," however, is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption.176 In the wake of Kiobel, few courts have found that
an extraterritorial tort has sufficiently touched and concerned the
territory of the United States, but there are two recent cases that
stand out.
The first was Mwani v. Laden.17 7  There, the court allowed
Kenyan nationals to move forward with a suit against Osama Bin
Laden' 7 ' and al-Qaeda for deaths resulting from the 1998 embassy
bombings in Kenya, arguing that the attack fit the scenario
outlined at the end of Kiobel.179 Differentiating it from the facts of
Kiobel, the court noted that part of the attack was planned in the
United States, and even though the plaintiffs were suing over
collateral deaths of Kenyan citizens, the overall attack was
directed against a U.S. embassy and its citizens.'s
The second prominent case finding that a matter touched and
concerned the United States is Sexual Minorities Uganda v.
Lively,'8 ' in which an organization representing lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and intersex people in Uganda sought to
173 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
174 Id. at 1669.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013).
178 Despite the notable issue of being dead, Bin Laden remained a defendant because
the case had been stayed (pending the verdict of Kiobel) before his assassination. See id.
at 1-2.
179 See id. at 5 ("It is obvious that a case involving an attack on the United States
Embassy in Nairobi is tied much more closely to our national interests than a case whose
only tie to our nation is a corporate presence here. Ample evidence has been presented
for me to conclude that the events at issue in this case were directed at the United States
government, with the intention of hanning this country and its citizens.").
80 See id.
181 Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013).
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bring suit against Scott Lively, a U.S. citizen, for crimes against
humanity because of his role in encouraging the repression of
LGBTI rights and assistance in developing laws to persecute
LGBTI people.'8 2 Lively filed a motion to dismiss on several
grounds, one of which was that Kiobel should prevent the suit, as
the harms occurred outside the United States."' The court bluntly
rejected this argument, distinguishing Kiobel by pointing out that
Lively was a U.S. citizen,' and that while the persecution may
have occurred abroad, the majority of Lively's offensive conduct
happened in the United States."ss The court found his actions
somewhat similar to the facts of Mwani, stating "[d]efendant's
alleged actions in planning and managing a campaign of
repression in Uganda from the United States are analogous to a
terrorist designing and manufacturing a bomb in this country,
which he then mails to Uganda with the intent that it explode
there."' 6  The court did not think Kiobel's restrictions should
apply "where a defendant and his or her conduct are based in this
country."'
Although courts are still in the process of fully defining
Kiobel, cases in which sufficient action touches and concerns the
United States are the exception, not the rule; the majority of ATS
claims after Kiobel have been dismissed when the events occurred
abroad, even if there is an American defendant.' The United
182 See id. at 310 ("Indeed, Defendant, according to the Amended Complaint, is
alleged to have maintained what amounts to a kind of 'Homophobia Central' in
Springfield, Massachusetts. He has allegedly supported and actively participated in
worldwide initiatives, with a substantial focus on Uganda, aimed at repressing free
expression by LGBTI groups, destroying the organizations that support them,
intimidating LGBTI individuals, and even criminalizing the very status of being lesbian
or gay.").
183 See id.
184 See id. at 322 ("This is not a case where a foreign national is being hailed into an
unfamiliar court to defend himself. Defendant is an American citizen located in the same
city as this court. The presumption against extraterritoriality is based, in large part, on
foreign policy concerns that tend to arise when domestic statutes are applied to foreign
nationals engaging in conduct in foreign countries.").
85 See id. at 321-22.
186 Id. at 322.
187 Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (emphasis added).
188 See Roger Alford, Lower Courts Narrowly Interpret Kiobel, OPINIo JURIS (Sept.
23, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/23/lower-courts-narrowly-interpret-kiobel/ ("It
is still too early to reach any serious conclusions about Kiobel's progeny. But the early
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated
unequivocally that Kiobel bars any claim that has "failed to allege
that any relevant conduct occurred in the United States."'89 In
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, the court held victims of apartheid could
not bring suit against American corporations that did business with
the South African government, which the plaintiffs argued
facilitated the government's many human rights abuses.9 o The
court rejected the idea that Kiobel created a multi-factor test and
held that a claim could not be raised under the ATS for "violations
of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign
other than the United States . . . . Accordingly, if all the relevant
conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under
Kiobel." ' More cases will need to be heard to fully clarify the
"narrow category"'9 2 of situations in which Kiobel's exception
applies, but for now the consensus is that "it [is] more difficult for
human rights activists to sue United States corporations for human
rights violations overseas."' 93
VI. Analysis and Impact
The Accord is a novel approach to the all too common problem
of unacceptable labor conditions-a problem that is especially
pervasive in Bangladesh, as there was never a time in the country's
history when it could institute modern industrialization or develop
strong unions.194 In the chaotic times following the end of
scorecard does not look promising for plaintiffs.").
189 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) ("The Plaintiffs'
argument, however, seeks to evade the bright-line clarity of the Court's actual holding.").
190 Id.
191 Id. at 189-90.
192 Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C 2013).
193 Alison Bensimon, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: Can
Corporations Have Their Cake and Eat It Too?, 10 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 199, 218
(2013). But see Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that "the
Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statue," although future human rights abuses likely will
be (and should be) addressed by more specific Congressional statutes such as the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991); see Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort
Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 173, 186-89 (2013) (arguing that
while Kiobel does present a barrier to transnational human rights litigation and will
require further case law, it is still open to a narrow interpretation which could bar only
"F-cubed action" (foreign defendant, foreign plaintiff, foreign events)).
194 See Zia Rahman & Tom Langford, Why Labour Unions Have Failed
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colonialism, the country oscillated between military dictators that
would strictly prohibit unions and socialist regimes that would
exploit unions for political purposes.'95 When globalization came
to Bangladesh in the 1980s, it was a "race-to-the-bottom." 9 6 The
country was controlled by a small group of ruling elites who
exploited their status and played up the perception of unions as
corrupt in order to attract garment manufacturers with some of the
lowest wages in the world and a large supply of available
workers.'97  As the garment industry grew to dominate
Bangladesh's economy, both factory owners and politicians
resisted changes that would threaten their profits, resulting in
negligent oversight and disasters like Tazreen Fashions and Rana
Plaza.' 98
It is unfortunate that the situation had to deteriorate so far in
order for reforms to occur, but the co-occurrence of the Accord
and the Integrated Plan of Action present a unique opportunity for
improving safety standards and workers' rights. The concurrent
implementation of the Accord and the Integrated Plan of Action
combines the money of retailers with the legislative power of the
government, providing each group with a tool not previously at
their disposal. The Accord represents a new model of
accountability because it holds retailers, the biggest beneficiaries
of the Bangladesh supply chain, jointly responsible for the
conditions of the actual manufacturers.'99 Although novel to the
current, international market for goods, the Accord uses principles
that were effective in eliminating sweatshop conditions in the
American garment industry in the mid twentieth century.200
Encouraging collective bargaining between workers, contractors,
and lead firms promotes better labor conditions, fair prices, and a
stable supply chain, and divides the costs of these improvements
Bangladesh's Garment Workers, in LABOUR IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: CHALLENGES AND
ALTERNATIVES FOR WORKERS 87, 89 (Sarah Mosoetsa & Michelle Williams eds., 2012).
195 See id. at 91-5.
196 Id. at 87.
197 See id.
198 See id. at 89-91.
199 Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Toward Joint Liability in Global
Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations, 35 CoMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 1, 2 (2013).
2oo See id.
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amongst all concerned parties.20
The cost of making the Bangladesh garment industry safe has
long been a barrier to change.202 Apart from simply losing profits,
government officials have also been hesitant to make changes and
risk losing millions of jobs, since the global nature of the garment
industry allows retailers to easily move to suppliers in other
countries with weaker regulations. 2 03 By some estimates, the cost
of implementing the goals of the Accord and the Integrated Plan of
Action could average $500,000 per factory, making the total cost
of the programs around $1 billion. 204 This number seems daunting
if applied to only a section of the industry, or for the Bangladeshi
government alone, but union representatives calculate that the cost
of the Accord could be covered by a "'very small increase ...
something like 20 per T-Shirt' when spread across all factories.20 5
After years of profiting from Bangladeshi suppliers, global
retailers should be willing to take on relatively minor losses to
create safe work environments. The more retailers that participate,
the lower the financial burden for all involved, so it is beneficial
for as many retailers as possible to join the Accord.
The absence of major American retailers is one of the primary
weaknesses of the Accord. Citing concerns about liability,
American retailers206 put forth their own plan, the Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety, Inc. (Alliance).207 In broad terms, the
Alliance is very similar to the Accord. It sets up a system of
improvements to be implemented over five years, such as
201 See id.
202 See Rahman & Langford, supra note 194, at 89-91.
203 The Editorial Board, A Promising Approach to Factory Safety, N. Y. TIMES (Jul.
I1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/opinion/a-promising-approach-to-
factory-safety.html.
204 Greenhouse, supra note 19.
205 Karen McVeigh, Major US Names Missing as Retailers Sign Deal to Improve
Bangladesh Safety, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 8, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.
com/business/2013/jul/08/retail-bangladesh-factories-improve-safety-deal (quoting
Christy Hoffman, Deputy General of UNI Global Union).
206 The Alliance currently has 26 members, most notably Costco, Gap, J.C. Penney,
Macy's, Sears, Target, and Wal-Mart. About the Alliance, ALLIANCE FOR BANGLADESH
WORKER SAFETY, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/about/about-the-alliance (last
visited Sept. 14, 2014).
207 Members Agreement of The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Inc., Jul.
10, 2013, available at http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/Alliance-Member-
Agreement-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Alliance Agreement].
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inspecting all factories, 208 creating remediation plans for workers,
providing worker training, and making factory and inspection data
transparent and available.209 The primary differences are in the
makeup of the membership, funding, and how members are bound
to the agreement. The only members of the Alliance are
retailers. 210 The Accord, however, divides power between retailers
and unions. 2 11 This is especially important with respect to the
inspection process, because it means the Accord's inspection team
is accountable to workers and retailers, whereas the Alliance
inspector is more similar to the previous system of internal
auditing.2 12 Partnering with unions gives the Accord checks and
balances within itself, rather than just outside monitoring of
unilateral action.
The Alliance is funded through member contributions.2 13
208 About the Alliance, supra note 206 (listing membership at approximately 700
factories); see also ALLIANCE FOR BANGLADESH WORKER SAFETY, PROTECTING THE LIVES
OF BANGLADESH GARMENT WORKERS: A 6-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE ALLIANCE
FOR BANGLADESH WORKER SAFETY (2014), available at http://www.bangladesh
workersafety.org/en/media-center/alliance-publications/159-6-month-report (reporting
that as of February 2014, 222 factories (31%) have been inspected, and they will inspect
100% of the listed factories by July 2014); see also Ellen Tauscher, Chairman of the
Board of Directors Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Prospect for Democratic
Reconciliation and Worker's Rights in Bangladesh, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations (Feb. 11, 2014), available at http://www.bangladesh
workersafety.org/en/media-center/alliance-publications/85-semi-annual-report (testifying
that since there is a 50% overlap between factories on the Alliance list and on the
Accord's list, both organizations have committed to publicizing and sharing inspection
data as it comes out to ensure every factory is inspected).
209 Greenhouse & Clifford, supra note 20.
21o About the Alliance, supra note 206.
211 Accord, supra note 7.
212 Press Release, Clean Clothes Campaign, Safety Scheme Gap and Wal-Mart Only
'Empty Promises' (Jul. 10, 2013), available at http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/press-
releases/2013/07/10/safety-scheme-gap-and-walmart.
213 Alliance Agreement, supra note 207, at art. 2.2 ("Members will create a fund ...
to underwrite Factory-based fire and building initiatives ... . [T]he Alliance's goal is to
attract membership which will approach or exceed total contributions of fifty million
dollars."); see also Alliance Agreement, supra note 207, at Attachment I (stating that
contributions are made based on the dollar value of merchandise exported from
Bangladesh each year, not to exceed $1,000,000 per member); see also Greenhouse &
Clifford, supra note 20 (projecting that this system should provide $42 million during the
5 years the plan is in effect); see also Alliance Agreement, supra note 207, at art. 2.2(d)
(enumerating, like the Accord, a provision for soliciting funds from third parties such as
governments, trade associations, NGOs, the ILO, and the World Bank).
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However, these funds are only intended to finance inspections,
training, and remediation efforts.2 14 The Alliance has no
provisions for guaranteeing that factory upgrades will occur.
Unlike the Accord, which creates a binding responsibility on a
retailer to ensure there are funds for repairs (through a variety of
means, but if necessary, direct funding), the Alliance only creates
a system of low interest loans called Affordable Capital for
Building Safety (ACBS).21 1 So far, members have pledged $100
million in loans,216 however, the member agreement specifically
states "[p]articipation in ACBS is not a condition of membership
in the Alliance"-meaning a member could retract funds with no
penalty.2 17 While the Accord makes all of its commitments
binding through its arbitration provision, the only penalty that
affects an Alliance member is a "termination fee."2 18 If a member
leaves before two years into the five-year commitment, they are
still responsible for paying the remainder of their dues (which
would be $5 million at most). 219  Leaving after two years, but
before five years, incurs a one-time penalty equal to the member's
220contribution for the previous year. If a member stops sourcing
from Bangladesh, it may leave the alliance without paying any
fees. Unlike the Accord, there is no provision requiring members
to maintain order volumes at factories trying to improve.2 2 1
The Alliance agreement is filled with good intentions, but
lacks enforcement power. Although the Alliance is more ambitious
and public than previous efforts, it is still essentially the same
strategy used in the past: self-policing. Unions and labor focused
NGOs have been very critical of the alliance.222 The Clean Clothes
214 Alliance Agreement, supra note 207, at art. 2.2.
215 Id. at art. 2.3.1.
216 Clothing Firms in Bangladesh: Accord, Alliance or Disunity?, THE ECONOMIST
(Jul. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21581752-transatlantic-
divide-among-big-companies-may-hinder-efforts-improve-workers-safety.
217 Alliance Agreement, supra note 207, at art. 2.3.1.
218 See id. at art. 9.
219 Id. at art. 9.1.
220 Id. at art. 9.2.
221 Id. at art. 9.3.
222 See Carey L. Biron, U.S. Retailers Unveil Contentious Bangladesh Safety
Agreement, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Jul. I1, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/07/u-s-
retailers-unveil-contentious-bangladesh-safety-agreement/ (noting that the AFL-CIO,
Labor Rights Forum, the Workers' Consortium see the Alliance as ignoring worker input
623
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Campaign, a signing witness to the Accord, called the Alliance
"empty promises" and attacked the Gap's and Wal-Mart's history
of promised but undelivered repairs, saying they "have no
credibility left on this issue."2 23 The alliance maintains that they
are committed to helping their suppliers but did not want to create
a binding agreement, because they were worried about creating
liability for supplier actions in Bangladesh.224
Alliance members are afraid that legally binding themselves to
their suppliers would allow an injured worker to sue them in the
United States. 2 5 However, after the decision in Kiobel, it seems
less likely that this could happen when the injury occurs outside
the United States, given the presumption of extraterritoriality
espoused by the Court. It is unlikely that a U.S. corporation,
contracting with a foreign third party supplier for merchandise,
would be an instance that "touch[ed] and concern[ed] the territory
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the
presumption. 226 Were something to go wrong, it would be a
foreign national, injured in a foreign country, by a foreign
wrongdoer, linked to the United States only through a business
relationship. But, having an American defendant is insufficient by
itself for ATS. While the four Justices concurring in the judgment
argued that there should be jurisdiction under the ATS when the
defendant is an American,22 7 the majority declined to adopt this
view, stating that the ATS was not meant to make "the United
States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of
international norms." 2 28  Even though the United States would
have jurisdiction over an American defendant, hearing a case on
acts occurring wholly outside the United States would still be
extraterritorial application of the ATS and is therefore barred.2 2 9 It
and too weak to create change).
223 Press Release, Clean Clothes Campaign, supra note 212.
224 See Greenhouse, supra note 19.
225 See id. (noting that Alliance members argue European retailers have a lower
threat of litigation since European courts are less hospitable to lawsuits because they
"generally prohibit class-action lawsuits, do not allow contingency fees for lawyers who
win cases and require losing parties to pay legal fees for both sides.").
226 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.
227 Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
228 Id. at 1668.
229 See Donald Childress, Kiobel Conmentarv: An ATS Answer with Many
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will take a few more test cases to fully flesh out what Kiobel
means, but for now it seems that U.S. courts will only hear cases
where the injury occurs in the United States or a violation of the
law of nations occurs in the United States, eventually causing an
injury outside the country.23 0
Kiobel has focused ATS discussions on the new question of
extraterritorial application. With respect to potential litigation for
another disaster in Bangladesh, it is important to remember the
first requirement the ATS poses: a claim can only proceed if it
"seeks to enforce an underlying norm of international law that is as
clearly defined and accepted as the international law norms
familiar to Congress in 1789 when the ATS was enacted." 231  The
Supreme Court has set the bar for what constitutes a norm of
international law quite high. The Court has rejected claims that
only appear to be prohibited by an international law or where the
principle of an international law could be extended to prohibit the
offending conduct, instead requiring that there be an "international
law [that] contains a universally accepted rule and defines that rule
specifically and uncontroversially to include defendant's alleged
conduct." 23 2 The Court did not specify which norms would meet
this standard,233 but as discussed in Part V, the majority of recent
ATS litigation has focused on terrorist attacks, extrajudicial
killings, and substantial human rights violations, such as
systematic persecution and punishment of minority groups or
forced labor. Although the actions of many Bangladesh factory
owners have been unconscionable and grossly negligent, it is
Questions (and the Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational Litigation),
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://wwvw.scotusbiog.con/2013
/04/kiobel-commentary-an-ats-answer-with-many-questions-and-the-possibility-of-a-
brave-new-world-of-transnational-litigation/ ("So, it appears that escaping the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the ATS context is not about "who" the
defendant is but about "where" the tortious conduct took place.").
230 See id.
231 Sexual Minorities Uganda, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)) ("The analysis, therefore, must proceed in two steps:
first, was there a violation of an international norm... ? Second, if so, is the crime
against humanity within the limited group of claims for which the ATS furnishes
jurisdiction.").
232 Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 353, 362 (2011)
(citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737).
233 Bensimon, supra note 193, at 207.
625
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
unlikely that even the most unsafe working conditions would meet
this standard, presenting further bars to foreign workers suing U.S.
corporations under the ATS.2 34
There is another theory of liability, though, that says
corporations violating human rights overseas could be sued in state
courts because states are free to create their own tort law and
recognize new causes of action.23  While it is likely that state
courts will refuse to hear cases on injuries occurring outside the
United States for the same reasons the Supreme Court found it to
be inappropriate, there is the possibility that one state would do
so. 23 6  Until that occurs, it is inappropriate for corporations to
mitigate their commitments to responsible supply chain
management by crying "liability, liability." The risk of liability
may simply be the cost of an effective approach, as without a
binding provision like the Accord's, internal industry agreements
on improving safety will continue to resemble the same ineffective
tactics of the last thirty years.3
VII. Conclusion
The Accord is an important step forward for Bangladesh's
garment industry, because its binding nature and power sharing
between unions and international retailers ensure corporate
accountability. It is an agreement that brings workers into the
solution. Although the binding nature is troublesome to some, it is
a key aspect in what makes the Accord unique and likely to
succeed. The unfortunate history of Bangladesh's factory disasters
is ample evidence that the old system was not working.
Government inspectors were often underfunded and bribed by
factory owners or pressured by politicians to look the other way.
234 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
235 Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum &
the Future of Alien Tort Litigation, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:51 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-
dutch-petroleum-the-future-of-alien-tort-litigation/; see generally Donald E. Childress,
The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100
GEO. L.J. 709 (2012) (arguing that the growing hostility towards ATS cases in the federal
courts will push creative plaintiffs into state courts).
236 See generally Childress, supra note 229 (discussing the possibility of
transnational cases in state court and the associated issues of choice of law, due process,
and federalism that will arise).
237 See Greenhouse, supra note 19.
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Internal audits of suppliers by retailers would often miss those
factories most at risk (smaller subcontractors hired by major
suppliers), and even when a substandard factory was found, the
result was a termination of the business relationship, which may
give the retailer a clear conscience but left workers in a building
that was still dangerous. Retailers committed to responsible
supply chain management should be encouraged to join the
Accord. More participating members mean more factories will be
covered under its provisions and the costs will be lower for all
involved. While the Accord could impose certain liabilities on its
U.S. members, in light of the recent ruling in Kiobel, this concern
seems unfounded. Retailers should not be skeptical in joining this
novel approach to workplace safety.
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